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58 
LULAC ON PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING: 
SOME CLARITY, MORE UNCERTAINTY 
Richard Briffault* † 
In League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”) v. Perry, the 
Supreme Court, for the second time in two years, agonized over partisan ger-
rymandering. LULAC’s rejection of a Democratic challenge to the Texas 
legislature’s mid-decade pro-Republican congressional redistricting resembles 
the Court’s 2004 dismissal of a Democratic gerrymandering suit against Penn-
sylvania’s pro-Republican congressional redistricting plan in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer. As in Vieth, the Justices wrangled over justiciability, the substantive 
standard for assessing the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims, 
and the interplay of justiciability and constitutionality. As in Vieth, the Court 
was highly fragmented: Vieth produced five separate opinions, while LULAC 
took that internal division one step further and generated six separate opinions 
on the partisan gerrymandering issue. As in Vieth, Justice Kennedy’s was the 
Court’s decisive voice, but none of the other Justices fully agreed with his 
disposition of LULAC’s partisan gerrymandering question.  
To be sure, unlike Vieth, LULAC actually resolved some of the legal is-
sues presented by partisan gerrymandering. The Court confirmed that 
partisan gerrymandering is a justiciable issue but found that a districting 
plan driven solely by partisan concerns is insufficient to make out a case of 
unconstitutional gerrymandering. LULAC, thus, seems to clarify somewhat 
the law of partisan gerrymandering. By the same token, however, it still fails 
to define what makes a districting plan an unconstitutional gerrymander. As 
a result, the outlook for the future of gerrymandering litigation remains 
murky. 
With respect to justiciability, a majority of the Court—Justices Kennedy, 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—held that an equal protection chal-
lenge to partisan gerrymandering presents a justiciable claim. This removes 
one important uncertainty created by Vieth, or more specifically, by Justice 
Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence. Prior to Vieth, in Davis v. Bandemer in 1986, 
the Court had held that gerrymandering claims are justiciable, although the 
Justices disagreed over what substantive standard to apply. In Vieth, four 
Justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, repudiated Bandemer’s justiciabil-
ity holding, while the four dissenters found that gerrymandering claims are 
justiciable but failed to agree on a standard for proving gerrymandering. 
Justice Kennedy’s somewhat delphic concurring opinion agreed that, given 
the lack of “any agreed upon model of fair and effective representation,” the 
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Court ought to “refrain from intervention” but held open the possibility of 
judicial relief in the future “[i]f workable standards” are found. Vieth, thus, 
appeared to leave the question of justiciability up in the air. The LULAC 
majority, however, expressly concluded that Vieth did not disturb Bande-
mer’s prior holding of justiciability, thus removing whatever uncertainty 
Vieth created. 
On the merits, Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that a purely parti-
san motivation for a redistricting plan is enough to render the plan 
unconstitutional. Partisan motivation has always been a factor in assessing 
gerrymandering. However, as Bandemer found, when a legislature under-
takes redistricting, some partisan motivation is inevitable, so partisanship by 
itself cannot be enough to invalidate a plan. In LULAC appellants argued 
that the Texas mid-decade redistricting presented an unusually clear case of 
sole, unvarnished partisan motivation. Texas had been redistricted in 2002 in 
order to satisfy the “one person, one vote” requirement in light of the 2000 
census. The only reason for the unusual, constitutionally unnecessary, mid-
decade redistricting was partisan—to increase the number of districts likely 
to elect Republicans. Whereas in other cases the role of partisanship or the 
balance between partisan and other factors might be debatable, here it was 
clear. By analogy to Shaw v. Reno’s treatment of the role of race in redis-
tricting, appellants argued that although some partisanship in districting is 
unavoidable, when partisanship is the sole motivating factor driving the en-
actment of a districting plan, that plan is presumptively unconstitutional.  
Although Justice Kennedy quibbled somewhat with appellants’ assess-
ment of the extent of partisan motivation, noting that “partisan aims did not 
guide every line [the Texas legislature] drew,” he ultimately concluded that 
even when partisan advantage is the sole motivation for the districting plan, 
that is not enough to make the plan unconstitutional. In his view, a challenge 
to the constitutionality of a partisan gerrymandering plan “must . . . show a 
burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’ representa-
tional rights.” Justice Kennedy failed to define “representational rights,” but 
the context indicates that he means the ability of a party to win a share of 
congressional seats that corresponds to that party’s share of the vote in con-
gressional races. Finding that the mid-decade plan produced a partisan 
balance in the Texas congressional delegation that more closely matched the 
Republican-Democratic split in the statewide vote than the plan it replaced, 
Justice Kennedy concluded it was a “fairer” plan notwithstanding its parti-
san motivation.  
Justice Kennedy’s assumption that the unconstitutionality of gerryman-
dering lies in the denial to a political party of its “fair share” of legislative 
seats is intuitively appealing. It grows naturally out of the equal protection 
case law that generated the “one person, one vote” and racial vote dilution 
doctrines, and it resonates with the idea of fair representation more broadly. 
Yet, it is problematic in several respects.  
First, treating the denial of proportional representation as the gravamen 
of the constitutional harm implicitly reads a norm of proportionality into the 
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equal protection clause, yet, as Justice Kennedy acknowledged in LULAC 
“there is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation.”  
Second, even assuming, in theory, that party proportionality ought to be 
part of the standard of fair representation, the single-member district system 
required by law for congressional elections and used in virtually every state 
for state legislative elections makes proportionality difficult to achieve in 
practice. The partisan division of voters across districts may not match the 
statewide partisan split. For example, if the backers of the two major parties 
are distributed evenly throughout a state, a party could win 51% of the vote 
in every district and 100% of the seats. On the other hand, if partisans are 
separated from each other and concentrated in different districts, then even 
significant shifts in voter support from one party to another might have little 
impact on district-specific electoral outcomes. 
Justice Kennedy implicitly acknowledged the practical difficulty with 
the disproportionality standard when he discussed the “symmetry standard” 
proposed in an amicus brief. “Symmetry” recognizes that single-member 
districting plans do not necessarily produce proportionate results and instead 
looks to see if a plan treats both major parties symmetrically. In other words, 
if one party receives x% of the seats when it gets y% of the vote, then the 
other party should also get x% of the seats (and not more or less) when it 
gets y% of the vote. “Symmetry” thus defines fairness not so much as pro-
portionality but as evenhandedness. Justice Kennedy rejected the use of the 
symmetry standard, finding it too dependent “on conjecture about where 
possible vote-switchers will reside.” Moreover, in addition to its reliance on 
“a hypothetical state of affairs” and “counterfactual[s],” symmetry fails to 
“provid[e] a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too 
much.”  
Yet, the same criticism can be raised about any approach to gerryman-
dering based on the relationship between votes cast and seats won. How 
much disproportionality is needed to create a constitutional violation? If 
modest disproportionality is enough to support a constitutional claim, then 
districting plans will be constantly subject to litigation. If substantial dis-
proportionality is a prerequisite to litigation, then few claims will succeed. 
The Bandemer plurality took the latter approach, requiring significant and 
protracted distortion of the seats-votes relationship in order to state a consti-
tutional claim. As a result, over a decade and a half under the Bandemer 
standard, virtually all gerrymandering challenges were rejected. 
Third, beyond the theoretical and practical difficulties of the proportion-
ality approach to “representational rights,” Justice Kennedy’s opinion fails 
to appreciate the constitutional harm that occurs when the sole motivation 
for a districting plan is partisanship. Justice Kennedy emphasizes the de-
mocratic purpose of redistricting: “drawing lines for congressional districts 
is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizens par-
ticipation in republican self-governance.” But an unabashedly partisan 
redistricting plan, adopted with the sole aim of reshaping the outcomes in 
particular districts constitutes the antithesis of “ensur[ing] citizen participa-
tion in republican self-governance.” The purpose of such a plan is to prevent 
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republican self-governance by creating districts that promote predictable 
outcomes, not competitive elections. With a purely partisan plan, the repre-
sentatives are choosing their people, rather than the people choosing their 
representatives. Political competition and government accountability to the 
people both suffer when legislators are free to manipulate districts with the 
admitted purpose of creating safe seats for particular candidates or parties. 
Put another way, while Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the appel-
lants show some impact on the “representational rights” of the plaintiff 
party, he failed to appreciate the potential impact of a highly partisan plan 
on the “representational rights” of the electorate as a whole. To be sure, in 
most gerrymandering cases the impact of a redistricting plan on the ability 
of the weaker party to win seats will be relevant to proving the partisan in-
tent of the enacting legislature. But in LULAC the pure partisan intent was 
unquestioned, so further evidence of the kind required by Justice Kennedy 
was unnecessary. 
LULAC’s rulings on justiciability and on the sole-partisan-motivation 
theory bring some clarity to the law. Indeed, they appear to move it back 
toward Bandemer, which also found gerrymandering justiciable, also em-
phasized the electoral effect of a gerrymander over motivation, and also 
failed to achieve majority support for a substantive gerrymandering stan-
dard. But the extreme fragmentation of the LULAC Court makes it difficult 
to say anything about the future of gerrymandering litigation.  
Strikingly, no Justice joined Justice Kennedy’s rejection of the sole-
motivation argument. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented; 
they would have held that sole-partisan motivation states a gerrymandering 
claim. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, adhered to his Vieth posi-
tion that gerrymandering is nonjusticiable and declined to address the 
merits. Chief Justice Roberts, with Justice Alito, joined in Justice Kennedy’s 
disposition of the partisan gerrymandering claim but expressly declined to 
specify whether that was based on justiciability concerns or on the merits. 
Most perplexing of all, Justice Souter (with Justice Ginsburg) joined in the 
Court’s finding of justiciability and joined Justice Kennedy’s rejection of a 
subsidiary equal protection argument—that the 2003 plan’s reliance on the 
2000 census, violated the “one person, one vote” rule—but did not take any 
position on the merits of the gerrymandering claim. Seeing “no majority for 
any single criterion of impermissible gerrymander[ing],” Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg chose to “treat the broad issue of gerrymander much as the subject 
of an improvident grant of certiorari,” even though as the case came before 
the Court as an appeal the “cert. improvidently granted” option was not ac-
tually available. Justices Souter and Ginsburg then observed that they did 
not “share Justice Kennedy’s seemingly flat rejection” of the significance of 
a highly partisan process nor did they “rule out the utility of a criterion of 
symmetry as a test.” As a result, the arguments dismissed by Justice Ken-
nedy could have some future life. 
LULAC’s treatment of the partisan gerrymandering question, thus, may 
be as significant for the continuing divisions and uncertainties it reveals as 
for the result it achieved. A majority of the Court is willing to grapple with 
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the gerrymandering issue but that majority is internally torn over what 
makes partisan gerrymandering a constitutional problem and when judicial 
intervention is appropriate. The Court’s difficulty is understandable. Gerry-
mandering is a challenge to democratic self-government, but judicial 
intervention requires a judicially manageable theory of democracy compati-
ble with the Constitution and our political institutions. It remains to be seen 
whether the Court can agree upon such a theory. Vieth and LULAC suggest 
that the outlook is not promising. 
